Most “dark web monitoring” is sold as a black box with a scary dashboard. I’d rather you understand exactly how it works, because then you can judge whether it’s worth it on the merits — not on the fear.
Here’s the whole mechanism.
It watches two different sources
Leaked credentials reach the open and criminal web two ways, and they look nothing alike. I watch both:
- Infostealer logs. When an employee’s device gets infected with info-stealing malware, it quietly copies every password and active login session saved in their browser, then uploads the lot to criminal markets. These logs name the exact service each credential belongs to — Microsoft 365, your AWS console, the bank portal — and they’re often live. This is the dangerous source.
- Breach data. When some other company gets breached, the leaked email/password list ends up circulating. If an employee reused a work password on that service, their work login is now in a public dump. I check every address on your domain against this wider breach index.
Free breach checkers only ever see the second source. The infostealer side — the live, service-specific one — is the part that actually catches intrusions before they happen, and it’s the part you’re paying for.
Why a stolen session is worse than a stolen password
This is the detail most people miss. Infostealer malware grabs session cookies — the token your browser holds that says “this person already logged in and passed MFA.” An attacker who replays that cookie walks straight into the account without a password and without triggering MFA, because as far as the service is concerned, the session is already authenticated.
So “we enforce MFA” doesn’t close this door. A stolen session is a skeleton key that expires — which is exactly why catching it fast matters, and why an alert sitting unread in an inbox is worthless.
The part that matters: a human reads it
Anyone can resell raw alerts. The value is what happens after a hit.
When something turns up on your domain, it comes to me first. I verify it isn’t a false positive, work out how exposed you actually are (is the password current? is it a live session? which service?), and send you a short, plain-language report: what leaked, which accounts, how serious, and the specific steps to shut it down — reset this, revoke that session, check for this sign-in. You get a security advisor interpreting the finding, not an automated email landing cold at 3am.
If a finding is bad enough to need hands-on help, I can walk the remediation with you — see my incident response guide for how I approach that.
Coverage: the whole domain, automatically
You give me one domain. Every address on it is covered — the new hire, the shared billing@ inbox, the admin account someone made in 2012 and forgot. There’s no employee list to maintain and nothing to install on anyone’s machine. New addresses are picked up as they appear.
How often it runs
Monitoring is continuous. New exposure is pulled near-real-time and triaged as it appears, so a critical finding reaches you in the window that matters — not in a monthly report. You also get a regular plain summary, so you can see the quiet months too.
What it is not
- It’s not hacking anything. The service only finds credentials that have already leaked publicly or into criminal markets.
- It’s alert-only. I never log into any of your accounts, and leaked credentials are never used to access anything — they’re surfaced so you can kill them.
- It’s not a replacement for your other controls. It sits alongside your AWS monitoring and endpoint security — see affordable AWS security monitoring for the rest of that stack. This closes the one specific gap of “a working login to your environment is already for sale and nobody knows.”
Ready to see your own exposure? Run a free exposure check → · read the full FAQ · see a sample report.